To the Arguments

15. To the arguments. To the first [q.1 n.2] the answer is plain from what was said in the fourth and fifth articles [nn.10, 11 supra].

16. To the second [q.1 n.3] I say that, according to the Commentator [Averroes, Metaphysics 2 com.1], there is no impossibility but a difficulty, the reason for which is that nature would have uselessly made separate substances if they could not be understood by any intellect. But this does not hold, because being understood by us is not the goal of separate substances. Hence, if they are not understood by us, they would not for this reason have been made uselessly;     etc .

17. Further, that they cannot be understood by us does not entail that they cannot be understood by themselves.

18. One must therefore      say that the eye of an owl only has intuitive vision, as is plain, and I then say that, just as it is impossible for the eye of an owl to see the sun, so it is impossible for God to be intuitively seen by the wayfarer naturally.

19. It can also be said in another way that the eye of an owl does see the sun at twilight, and just as its eye then sees the sun imperfectly so do we understood separate substances imperfectly.

20. To the third [n.4] I say that Aristotle is speaking there of an infinite in possibility, and such a thing, as far as it is infinite, is unknown; but God is an infinite in act;     therefore etc     .

21. To Gregory [n.5] I say that however much the mind of the wayfarer may advance in contemplation of God, yet it will not be able to reach distinct knowledge, but it can well reach some natural knowledge of God - not however of his essence as it is this essence, but to a knowledge of God, or of his essence, under the idea of being. This sort of knowledge is called inferior, however, because it is not a perfect and distinct knowledge as of the essence as it is this essence; wherefore etc.